On March 11, militants of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) hijacked a train with approximately 400 passengers in the mountainous region between Quetta and Sibi in Pakistan. After releasing the women and children, the BLA militants demanded the release of their compatriots from prison in exchange for the remaining passengers. The government of Pakistan refused to negotiate and launched a military operation to free the passengers, which lasted for well over 24 hours.  Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) official stated that there were 21 civilian fatalities and that four Frontier Corps personnel lost their lives in the operation. However, various media outlets have hinted that the Pakistani forces may have incurred further significant losses. Subsequently, Pakistan’s security forces came under heavy attack in different parts of Balochistan.

A united insurgency

Before the train hijacking, there were growing concerns about the deteriorating security situation in Balochistan. During a discussion in Pakistan’s National Assembly, some members expressed anxiety that parts of Balochistan may secede from Pakistan. However, intelligence agencies failed to detect a large operation in the making.

The train hijack has demonstrated that insurgents have acquired operational capabilities to launch massive attacks on Pakistan’s security forces and that they can withstand the firepower of special forces for well over 24 hours. Notably, during the stand-off, the militants also deployed effective social media strategies to convey their narrative to the wider world, which is indicative of the insurgents’ increasing tactical sophistication. The episode also shows that there seems to be improved coordination between various Baloch insurgent groups.

As society in Balochistan is structured along tribal loyalties, numerous organisations and armed groups have emerged to articulate the grievances of the Baloch people. While tribal loyalties continue to endure, there seems to be a gradual shift in the composition of armed groups, with middle-class and educated youngsters joining them. The BLA is the most formidable group and has been declared a terrorist organisation by Pakistan and the U.S. While the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) is reportedly more popular among the younger population in southern regions of the province, the Baloch Republican Guards (BRG) is active in areas such as Bolan, Quetta, Sibi, and Naseerabad. A few years ago, these armed groups along with the Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) decided to collaborate under the banner of Baloch Raji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS).  The objective of the BRAS is to launch coordinated attacks on Pakistan’s military infrastructure and its intelligence apparatus with greater ferocity.

Concerns of the Baloch people

The current insurgency in Balochistan is not the first of its kind. In fact, the province has witnessed multiple insurgencies, such as the ones in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and mid-2000s.

It is important to note that, alongside armed insurgency, there exists a people’s movement advocating for improved access to basic necessities such as drinking water, tackling the rising costs of essential commodities like petrol and medicine, regulating the presence of Chinese fishing trawlers, and ensuring unhindered access to the sea for fishermen. Last year, Balochistan witnessed massive protests led by women who demanded the cessation of custodial killings and fake encounters. The defence forces have often deployed coercive measures such as enforced disappearances (illegal detentions/abductions).

Over the years, the Pakistani government has attempted to portray the discontent in Balochistan as a consequence of power contestations involving a few tribal chieftains in the province. However, there is no denying that Balochistan was subjected to political and socio-economic neglect. Many in Balochistan complain that their province was forcefully incorporated into Pakistan in 1948. Furthermore, the people of Balochistan rarely experienced political empowerment because of decades of military rule and centralised governance. The province has numerous natural resources, such as coal, copper, gold, and natural gas. However, the exploitation of these resources has not improved local people’s livelihoods.

To compound such miseries of the local population, massive infrastructure projects (such as the Gwadar Port) as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) were operationalised without adequate stakeholder consultation. The construction of these projects resulted in people migrating to Balochistan from different parts of the country, prompting concerns about demographic shifts that would adversely impact the interests of the local Baloch population.

Insurgent groups have often articulated their protest against the CPEC and have called upon China to withdraw from the province. Sadly, there were instances — such as the suicide bombing at Karachi University and the bombing of a bus near the Dasu hydropower project — in which Chinese civilians were killed. There is, therefore, growing concern in Beijing about the Pakistan army’s ability to provide security to Chinese personnel working on various CPEC projects. There are reports that China may consider a proactive approach, such as deploying private security companies, to protect its civilians and interests. While China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was criticised for pushing countries into debt traps, in Pakistan, which is Beijing’s most valued strategic partner, the CPEC, a critical component of the BRI, has come under sustained physical attacks.

Regional complexities

The geopolitical context, thus far, has not been conducive to the success of the Baloch insurgent movement. While the province accounts for 44% of the country’s landmass, it has approximately 5% of the country’s population. It may be easy for security forces to contain the separatist movement, as they constitute a very small percentage of the population.

Additionally, the Balochistan independence movement has not received significant international support. The province is not geographically contiguous to India, and therefore, India is not in a position to provide material support to Baloch armed groups. The Baloch nationalist imagination also incorporates the Sistan province of Iran, which consequently makes Iran reluctant to support the Baloch separatist movement. Further, with the deterioration of the security environment in Pakistan, Tehran is worried that anti-Iranian groups are finding a haven in the neighbouring Balochistan province. Last year, Iran conducted missile and drone strikes targeting ‘Iranian terrorists’ in Balochistan.

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan brought about significant geopolitical shifts in the region. There is a growing rift between the Taliban and the Pakistan army, with occasional skirmishes on the borders. Taliban representatives have often made statements which suggest that they would not recognise the Durand line that delineates the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The Taliban has also, despite many demands from the Pakistan Army, refused to contain the presence of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). There has been a significant uptick in the activities of TTP in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan.

Many in Pakistan’s security establishment perceive growing coordination between the TTP and the BLA. Pakistan’s official statements that “terrorists were in direct communications with Afghanistan-based planners” suggest that all is not well between Pakistan and various armed groups in Afghanistan. The TTP, with its Pashtun cadres and the BLA, with its Baloch cadres, constitute a significant threat on Pakistan’s western border. On the other hand, Pakistan has invested considerable security resources on its eastern borders with India. The India-Pakistan bilateral relationship continues to remain cold, and Islamabad’s Kashmir policy has yet to factor-in different ground realities. It is unclear how the new Trump administration would respond to the unrest in Pakistan.

Lack of popular support

Pakistan’s domestic politics will broadly define the trajectory of unrest in Balochistan. Pakistan’s military lost considerable respect because of its crude handling of a popular leader like Imran Khan. The current civilian leadership’s hold on power is attributed to its closeness to the military rather than to its popularity among the masses. Given the legitimacy crisis of the military-civilian leadership, it is unlikely they would indulge in serious negotiations. It would be prudent of Pakistan’s military-civilian leadership to decentralise power and share revenues from resource extraction with the people of Balochistan. Otherwise, the turmoil in Balochistan will continue to endure.